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We study the importance of uncertainty and public finance to the welfare ranking of three 
environmental policy instruments: pollution taxes, pollution permits and Kyoto-like numerical 
rules for emissions. The setup is the basic stochastic neoclassical growth model augmented 
with the assumptions that pollution occurs as a by-product of output produced and 
environmental quality is treated as a public good. To compare alternative policies, we 
compute welfare-maximizing values for the second-best policy instruments. We find that, in 
all cases studied, pollution permits are the worst policy choice, even when their revenues 
finance public abatement. When the main source of uncertainty is economic, the most 
efficient recipe is to levy pollution taxes and use the collected tax revenues to finance public 
abatement. However, when environmental uncertainty is the dominant source of extrinsic 
uncertainty, numerical rules, being combined with tax-financed public abatement, are better 
than pollution taxes. 
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1. Introduction   
 
Environmental degradation caused by human activities is a main concern worldwide. 
When economic agents do not internalize the effects of their actions on the 
environment, there is need for government intervention to enact appropriate policies 
that deal with the negative externalities of pollution emissions. Policy intervention can 
take many forms. It is thus useful to be able to rank alternative environmental policies 
according to certain criteria, so that the society can choose the best one.    
  Examples of environmental policy instruments include pollution taxes, 
pollution permits (also known as cap-and-trade policy) and numerical targets for 
cutting emissions (also known as command-and-control policy).
1 All three are 
distorting and so second best. In the case of taxes, the government raises the price of 
pollution-generating activities. In the case of permits, the government creates a market 
for pollution, by issuing a number of permits, and firms pollute as much as they wish 
to the extent that they pay the price. In the case of numerical targets, the government 
sets an emission standard directly so that firms have to restrict their production 
accordingly and/or make particular technology and fuel choices. Although this list is 
not exhaustive,
2 there has always been a lot of interest in the relative desirability of 
these three instruments by both policymakers and researchers (among researchers, see 
e.g. Stokey, 1998, section 6).    
  Two issues are particularly important to the debate on the choice of the 
appropriate policy instrument. The first issue has to do with the size and source of 
uncertainty. In assessing the risks from climate change and the costs of averting it, 
there is a variety of uncertainties that contribute to big differences of opinion as to 
how, and how much, to limit emissions (on uncertainty and the environment, see e.g. 
the Congressional Budget Office paper prepared for the Congress of the US, 2005). 
The second issue refers to the public finance requirements of environmental 
protection. It is recognized that the more ambitious is the environmental policy, the 
higher the finance requirements for adaptation and mitigation actions,
3 and public 
                                                           
1 An example of numerical targets is the reduction of emissions by 25-40% compared to 1990 levels by 
2020. Such rules were a key part of the Kyoto protocol designed in 1997 and continue to be a debated 
issue (see the Copenhagen UN Conference in December 2009). 
2 For other second-best policy instruments to reduce pollution, see e.g. Goulder et al. (1999) and 
Bovenberg and Goulder (2002). 
3 According to the European Commission’s estimates, finance requirements could reach 100 billion 
euros per year by 2020 in developing countries only (see the Communication from the European 
Commission, 2009).   2  
finance should play a key role in meeting these requirements (on finance and the 
environment, see e.g. the Communication from the European Commission, 2009).
4 
  In this paper, we study the roles of uncertainty and public finance in the 
welfare ranking of alternative environmental policies in a micro-founded dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. Motivated by the above, we focus on 
the three following policy regimes. We first model the case in which the government 
levies taxes on polluting activities and uses the collected tax revenues to finance public 
abatement activities. We then study the case in which public abatement activities are 
financed by the sale of auctioned pollution permits. We finally study the case in which 
environmental policy takes the form of binding numerical rules à la Kyoto, which 
specify both a long-term pollution target and the speed to that target over time. 
  Our setup is a basic stochastic neoclassical growth model augmented with the 
assumptions that pollution occurs as a by-product of output produced and 
environmental quality has a public good character. Within this setup, there is reason 
for policy intervention. There are two exogenous stochastic processes that create 
uncertainty about future outcomes. The first is uncertainty about production technology 
(standard shocks to total factor productivity) and the second arises from uncertainty 
about the impact of economic activity on the environment.
5 Loosely speaking, we call 
the former shock “economic” and the latter “environmental”. 
We study the implications of the above three policy regimes for economic 
outcomes (output, consumption, etc), environmental quality and, ultimately, social 
welfare. The latter is defined as the conditional expectation of the discounted sum of 
household’s lifetime utility. Since the equilibrium solution in each regime depends on 
the value of the second-best policy instruments employed, we compare the alternative 
policy regimes when the policy instruments under each regime take their welfare-
maximizing values. We focus on flat over time policy instruments (see also e.g. 
Stokey and Rebelo, 1995). To solve the model and compute the associated welfare 
under each policy regime, we approximate both the equilibrium solution and the 
welfare criterion to second-order around their non-stochastic long-run (in particular, 
we use the methodology of Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2004).   
                                                           
4 Governments undertake a lot of environmental protection activities (known as public abatement). 
Examples include policies that protect, conserve and generate (via innovation) the natural resources, as 
well as policies that provide the right environmental incentives. All these are costly activities that 
require public funds. Actually, the proportion of public expenditure in total expenditure on abatement is 
high in most countries (see e.g. Hatzipanayotou et al., 2003, and Haibara, 2009). 
5 Future trends in emissions are uncertain depending on the pace of economic growth, the demand for 
fossil fuel, the development of technologies, etc (see e.g. the Congressional Budget Office paper prepared 
for the Congress of the US, 2005).   3  
  Our main results are as follows. First, public abatement activities constitute an 
important part of environmental policy. Policies that yield no pollution revenues, and 
do not allow for public abatement, suffer a disadvantage relative to revenue-yielding 
policies like pollution taxes and auctioned pollution permits.
6 In our setting, this 
implies that, without being combined with public abatement policy, pure Kyoto-like 
rules cannot be comparable to taxes and permits and, at least for a wide range of 
parameter values, such rules are clearly inferior to taxes and permits. Hence, to make 
the comparison of alternative regimes meaningful when we move to a stochastic 
world, instead of studying pure rules, we study a mixed regime that combines (in the 
long run) rules with public abatement policy financed by, say, pollution taxes. Now, 
when second-best policy instruments take their welfare-maximizing values, all three 
policy regimes give the same welfare in a deterministic world. This implication is 
consistent with Weitzman (1974).      
  Second, in an uncertain world, permits are clearly the worst regime. They may 
fix environmental quality at a relatively high level, but only at the cost of exposing 
this quality to exogenous shocks and damaging private consumption. Actually, the 
higher the extrinsic (economic or environmental) uncertainty, the higher is the 
disadvantage of permits relative to taxes and mixed rules. This holds for a wide range 
of parameters, shocks and relative variances of different categories of shocks. We 
believe this happens (i.e. permits are inferior to both taxes and mixed rules) because 
they are a hybrid of price- and quantity-based regulations.
7 As a price-based 
instrument, they are less closely connected to the heart of the market failure (pollution 
externality) than pollution taxes. At the same time, as a quantity-based instrument, 
they provide less controllability than numerical rules that command agents to produce 
or emit a certain level.  
  Third, in an uncertain world, the verdict of taxes versus mixed rules is open 
depending on the relative variances of different categories of shocks affecting the 
economy. The main advantage of rules over taxes is that they eliminate environmental 
volatility. But this is achieved at the cost of lower and more volatile consumption. 
When extrinsic uncertainty arises from economic sources, the latter effects dominate 
and hence taxes are preferable to rules. However, when environmental uncertainty is 
the dominant source, the former effects dominate and so rules are preferable. To 
                                                           
6 This presupposes that any revenues from pollution taxes or auctioned permits are earmarked for the 
financing of public abatement. This is a conventional notion in the literature. See e.g. Haibara (2009).    4  
further analyze this finding, we examine the first and second moments of those 
endogenous variables that determine welfare under each policy regime and each level 
of uncertainty. Commands to produce a certain level of output enjoy an efficiency 
advantage when environmental uncertainty is high and the marginal benefits from 
nature protection are big. By contrast, when environmental uncertainty is relatively 
low, it is better to name a price and let private agents find the optimal quantities 
themselves; in this case, policies like numerical rules for emissions, which reduce the 
number of choices that private agents can make, hurt the macro economy. This 
intuition is consistent with Weitzman’s (1974, pp. 485-6) interpretation, comparing 
price vs quantity controls in a static framework. 
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section explains how 
we differ from the literature. Sections 3, 4 and 5 solve for taxes, permits and rules 
respectively. The first-best is in section 6. Section 7 compares welfare across regimes. 
Section 8 closes the paper. An appendix includes details.    
 
2.  How we differ from the literature   
 
Our work is the first attempt to welfare-rank these three debated second-best 
environmental policies (taxes, permits and numerical rules) in a unified micro-
founded DSGE model, by paying particular attention to the source of uncertainty 
faced. Our work also differs because we allow the government to play a mix of roles 
(to correct externalities, to raise funds to finance public abatement and to shield the 
economy from shocks) that are important in the policy debate. Finally, we look not 
only at the final welfare effects, but also at the various channels through which 
extrinsic uncertainty shapes welfare and, in particular, we look at the first and second 
moments of endogenous economic and environmental variables.  
In his seminal work, Weitzman (1974) compared price- and quantity-based 
regulations showing that uncertainty causes otherwise equivalent policies to produce 
different results. Weitzman focused on the case in which the regulator is uncertain 
about the marginal cost and benefit of pollution and (as Bovenberg and Goulder, 
2002, p. 1530, and Schöb, 1996, point out) worked in a first-best setting in the sense 
that regulation does not distort private decisions. Since then there has been a rich and 
still expanding literature on the comparison of alternative policy instruments in the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
7 As explained by Bovenberg and Goulder (2002, p. 1520), they are price-based because market forces 
determine the price of permits. On the other hand, they are quantity-based because the government sets   5  
presence of uncertainty. However, in most of these papers, the approach has been 
static and/or partial equilibrium, and the comparison is between taxes and quotas only 
(see the survey by Bovenberg and Goulders, 2002, section 4.2). An exception is Pizer 
(1999) who used a DSGE model. However, he compared “rate controls” with taxes 
only. In addition, as noted above, here we use a second-order approximation to both 
the equilibrium solution and the welfare criterion. This is important because it allows 
us to take properly into account the effects of uncertainty on welfare evaluations.  
It is worth stressing that the previous environmental literature has not 
examined the importance of the source of extrinsic uncertainty for the choice of 
efficient policies; as we find, this is crucial. In addition, the literature has not 
considered public abatement together with pollution regulation.
8 Finally, none of the 
previous studies has studied numerical rules for emissions.  
 
3.  A model with pollution taxes  
 
We augment the basic stochastic neoclassical growth model with natural resources 
and environmental policy. The economy is populated by a large number of identical 
infinitely-lived private agents that derive utility from private consumption and the 
stock of environmental quality. Private agents consume, save and produce a single 
good. Output produced generates pollution and this damages environmental quality.
9 
Since private agents take economy-wide environmental quality as a public good, i.e. 
they do not internalize the effects of their actions on the environment, the 
decentralized equilibrium is inefficient. Hence, there is room for government 
intervention.  
We start by studying the case in which the government imposes taxes on 
polluting activities and in turn uses the collected tax revenues to finance public 
abatement policy. This is a usual environmental policy in the growth literature (see e.g. 
Xepapadeas, 2004, and Economides and Philippopoulos, 2008).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
the total amount of permits and emissions. See also below. 
8 Schöb (1996), Goulder et al. (1999) and Bovenberg and Goulder (2002, section 4.1), among many 
others, have also emphasized the public-finance aspect of environmental policies. But they focus on the 
so-called revenue recycling effect, which means that the revenues generated by environmental policy 
can be used to finance cuts in pre-existing more distorting taxes. Baldursson et al. (2008) focus on the 
time-consistency of various environmental policy instruments. 
9 Our results do not change if pollution also occurs as a by-product of consumption. On the other hand, 
modeling pollution as a by-product of economic activity (production or consumption) can differ from 
the case in which natural resources are extracted from preserved natural environments to be used as 
inputs in production.         6  
Private agents    
For simplicity, the population size is constant and equal to one. The private agent’s 
expected utility is defined over stochastic sequences of private consumption,  t c , and 
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where  1 0 < < β  is a time preference rate and  0 E  is an expectations operator based on 
the information available at time zero. 
Without loss of generality, we use for instantaneous utility: 
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where  0, 1 1 µ µ <− <  are the weights given to consumption and environmental 
quality respectively and  1 σ ≥  is a measure of risk aversion. 
The private agent’s within-period budget constraint is: 
 
1 (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
k
t t tt tt t t kk c y A k
α δτ τ + −− +=− =−                                                                (2) 
 
where  tt t yA k
α =  is current output,
10  1 + t k  is the end-of-period capital stock,  t k  is the 
beginning-of-period capital stock,  t A  is a standard index of production technology 
(whose stochastic motion is defined below),  1 0 < <α  and 0 1
k δ ≤ ≤  are usual 
parameters, and  1 0 < ≤ t τ  is the tax rate on (polluting) output.   
The agent chooses  10 {, } tt t ck
∞
+ =  to maximize (1a-b) subject to (2) taking policy 
variables and environmental quality as given. The latter is justified by the open-access 
and public-good features of the environment.   
  
                                                           
10 We abstract from labor-leisure choices to keep the model simpler. We report that this is not 
important qualitatively.   7  
Natural resources   
The stock of environmental quality evolves over time according to:




tt t t QQ Q p g δ δν + =− + −+                                                                                 (3) 
 
where  0 Q ≥  represents environmental quality without pollution,  t p  is the current 
pollution flow,  t g  is public spending on abatement activities, and 01
q δ ≤≤  and 
0 ν ≥  are parameters measuring respectively the degree of environmental persistence 
and how public spending is translated into actual units of renewable natural resources.    
The flow of pollution,  t p , is modeled as a by-product of output produced,  t y :   
 
tt tt t t p yA k
α φφ ==                                                                                                          (4) 
 
where  t φ  is an index of pollution technology or a measure of emissions per unit of 
output.
12  We assume that  t φ  is stochastic (its motion is defined below).          
 
Government budget constraint  
Assuming a balanced budget for the government, we have in each period: 
 
tt tt t t gyA k
α ττ ==                                                                                                          (5) 
 
so that clean-up policy,  t g , is financed by taxes on polluting activities.  
 
Exogenous stochastic variables 
We assume that the two technologies,  t A  and  t φ , follow  (1) AR  stochastic processes 
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11 The motion of natural resources in (3) is as in Jouvet et al. (2005); see p. 1599 in their paper for 
further details. The inclusion of the parameter  0 Q ≥  is helpful when we solve the model numerically. 
12 One could assume that pollution technology has also an endogenous component depending on e.g. 
private and public investment in pollution-reducing technology.   8  




φ ε ε  are Gaussian i.i.d. shocks with zero means and known variances denoted as 
2
a σ  
and 
2
φ σ . 
 
Decentralized competitive equilibrium (given pollution tax rates) 
The Decentralized Competitive Equilibrium (DCE) of the above economy can be 
summarized by the following equations at any  0 t ≥  (see Appendix A for details):  
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  We thus have a three-equation system in  11 0 {, , } tt t t ck Q
∞
+ += . This DCE is for 
given policy (where the latter is summarized by pollution tax rates  0 {} tt τ
∞
=  levied by 
the government), initial conditions for the stock variables,  0 k  and  0 Q , and stochastic 
processes for the exogenous variables,  t A  and  t φ . In section 7, we will choose the 
pollution tax rate optimally.
13   
 
4.  The same model with pollution permits  
 
The government creates a market for pollution by issuing a number of permits that 
matches its maximum target amount of pollution. In order to pollute legally, a private 
agent has to hold a number of permits equal to its own quantity of pollution. In turn, the 
government uses the collected revenues to finance public abatement policy. The model 
in this section is similar to that in Jouvet et al. (2005).   
In particular, we assume that at each time t, the government issues a quantity 
of pollution permits,  t P , and auctions them at a price,  t q . These permits are bought in 
                                                            
13 The case of Pigouvian taxes, in which tax rates are chosen to correct for externalities only, can 
follow as a special case. See Appendix A for details.   9  
the current period but can be used by the polluting private agent/firm in the next time 
period,  1 t + .




tt t t t t t t kk c q p y A k
α δ ++ −− ++ = =                                                                        (8) 
 
where  11 11 1 1 tt tt t t p yA k
α φφ ++ ++ + + == . Thus, although the private agent keeps treating  t Q  
as given (public good), he now realizes that  tt tt t t p yA k
α φφ ==  when he solves his 
problem.   
  The government budget constraint changes from equation (5) to:  
    
tt t gq P =                                                                                                                        (9) 
 
Decentralized competitive equilibrium (given the quantity of pollution permits) 
The Decentralized Competitive Equilibrium (DCE) of the above economy can be 






tt t t t
t
P
kk c q P δ
φ
−
+ −− ++ =                                                                                (10a) 
11 1
11 1 1 1
1
(1 [ ]) [ (1 )]
k tt
tt t t t t t t
tt
uu
qE A k E A k
cc
αα αφ β δ α
−− +





                                  (10b)      
11 (1 )
qq
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11 1 1 [] tt t t t t t PE p E A k
α φ ++ + + ==                                                                                       (10d) 
 
  We thus have a four-equation system in  11 0 {, , ,} tt t t t ck Q q
∞
+ += . This new DCE is 
for given policy - where the latter is summarized by the quantity of pollution permits 
0 {} tt P
∞
=  issued by the government - initial conditions for the stock variables,  0 k  and 
0 Q , and stochastic processes for the exogenous variables,  t A  and  t φ . In section 7, we 
will choose the quantity of pollution permits optimally.
16 
                                                            
14 This is close to the recent Obama climate-change bill, where the government issues a fixed number 
of permits to emit carbon dioxide each year, which firms must buy before releasing their stuff into the 
atmosphere (see e.g. The Economist, July 4, 2009, p. 37). 
15 Equation (10d) is a market-clearing condition which states that, in equilibrium, agents’ demand for 
pollution equals supply with the latter determined by the government. See also Jouvet et al. (2005). 
16 We will also report results for the symmetrically opposite case in which the government sets the 
price of permits  0 {} tt q
∞
=  allowing their quantity to be endogenously determined. The case, in which   10  
5.  The same model with Kyoto-like numerical rules for emissions   
 
We now study the case in which the government sets a long-term pollution target and 
also specifies the speed to that target. By speed, we mean that pollution tomorrow will 
be a fraction of pollution today, where this fraction is also part of environmental 
policy. In our setup, this approach can be captured by a policy rule like: 
 
t t t t p p p γ γ + − = + ) 1 ( 1                                                                                                 (11) 
 
where  p  is long-run pollution and 0 1 t γ < ≤  is an autoregressive “parameter”. The 
values of  p  and  0 {} tt γ
∞
=  are policy instruments.  
  Assuming that emission rules are binding all the time, and since 
tt tt t t p yA k
α φφ ==  at all t, the motion of pollution in (11) also determines the motion 
of capital,  10 {} tt k
∞
+= ; in turn, private consumption follows residually from the private 
agent’s budget constraint.
17 Note that now there are neither public revenues nor public 
cleanup, 0 ttt gq τ ===  (see below for further details).   
   
Decentralized competitive equilibrium (given pollution rules) 
The Decentralized Competitive Equilibrium (DCE) of the above economy can be 
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  We thus have a three-equation system in  11 0 {, , } tt t t ck Q
∞
+ += . This new DCE is for 
given policy - where the latter is summarized by the long-run pollution target,  p , and 
the autoregressive “parameter”  0 {} tt γ
∞
=  in (11) - initial conditions for the stock 
                                                                                                                                                                      
permits are chosen to correct for externalities only, can follow as a special case. See Appendix B for 
details.    
17 See also the discussion in Stokey (1998, p. 18). The property that, in this policy regime, the private 
agent is left with nothing to choose is a special case of the more general property that all command-
and-control policies reduce the number of choices that private agents can make.    11  
variables,  0 k  and  0 Q , and stochastic processes for the exogenous variables,  t A  and 
t φ . Section 7 below will choose the values of these policy instruments optimally.   
 
6.  Social planner solution     
 
We finally present the social planner’s solution. This is the first-best serving as a 
benchmark. The planner chooses allocations  11 0 {, , , } tt t tt cgk Q
∞
+ +=  directly to maximize 
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0 t ξ >  is a dynamic multiplier associated with (13c).  
  We thus have a five-equation system in  11 0 {, , , ,} tt t t t t cgk Q ξ
∞
+ += . This is given 
initial conditions for the stock variables,  0 k  and  0 Q , and stochastic processes for the 
exogenous variables,  t A  and  t φ . We report that this first-best solution is always 
welfare superior to the second-best regimes studied in sections 3-5 (this holds for any 
feasible values of the distorting policy instruments).    
 
7.  Evaluation of second-best policies   
 
This section evaluates the alternative second-best policy regimes developed in 
sections 3-5. Since the DCE solution and the resulting welfare under each policy 
regime depend on the value(s) of the policy instrument(s), we will compare the   12  
optimum welfare across regimes, namely, the welfare resulting from the optimally 
chosen value(s) of the policy instrument(s) in each regime. Welfare is defined as the 
conditional expectation of the discounted sum of household’s lifetime utility.  
In our context, when choosing its distorting policy instruments, the 
government tries to do the following:
18 First, to correct for pollution externalities 
(Pigouvian policy). Second, to create revenues that can be used to finance public 
abatement (and, in richer contexts, to reduce other taxes). Third, to minimize the 
distorting effects of policy intervention on the economy. For instance, taxes and 
permits increase the cost of production, while emission/output rules reduce the 
number of private choices. Fourth, since there is also uncertainty, the government 
aims to reduce volatility. Optimal policy will reflect all four tasks. Note that the first 
three tasks have to do with the so-called allocative role of the government.         
We start by explaining how we work and by presenting parameter values used 
in the numerical solutions.  
 
How we work   
We focus on flat policy instruments, namely, policy instruments that remain constant 
over time (see e.g. Stokey and Rebelo, 1995, and Ortigueira, 1998). We then compute 
welfare for a wide range of values of the flat policy instrument(s) in each regime and 
then find the welfare maximizing-value of these policy instrument(s) and the 
associated maximum welfare under that regime. In all cases reported, there is a 
tradeoff in policy and hence a well-defined welfare-maximizing value of the policy 
instrument(s).  
To this end, we approximate both the DCE solution and the welfare criterion 
to second-order around the associated non-stochastic steady state solution in each 
policy regime. Note that, in contrast to solutions that impose certainty equivalence, 
the solution to second-order approximation allows us to take into account the 
                                                            
18 For a discussion of various impacts of environmental policy, see Bovenberg and Goulder (2002, p. 
1514).   13  
uncertainty that the agents face when making decisions.
19 In particular, the second-
order approximation of welfare follows from equations (1a-b) and is given by:
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where, for any variable  t x ,  ˆ ln( / ) ( )/ tt t x xx x xx ≡≅ −  and x is the long-run value of 
t x . Also,  1 (1 ) ( , ) au c Q µ σ ≡− ,  2 (1 )(1 ) ( , ) au c Q µ σ ≡ −− , 
22
3















5 (1 )(1 ) ( , ) au c Q µµ σ ≡− − . The values of  ˆt c  and  ˆ
t Q  
follow from the second-order approximation of the DCE as said above.    
Finally, we need a measure of comparison of welfare gains/losses associated 
with alternative regimes. This measure, denoted as  ij ζ  in what follows, is obtained by 
computing the percentage compensation in private consumption that the private agent 
would require in each time-period under regime  j  so as to be equally well off 
between regimes i and  j i ≠  (see the notes in Table 3 for the value of  ij ζ ). This is a 
popular measure in dynamic general equilibrium models (see e.g. Lucas, 1990, and 
Cooley and Hansen, 1992).  
 
Parameter values   
We keep all parameter values the same across different regimes, so that the evaluation 
of different environmental policies is not blurred by differences in parameter values. 
Where the parameters are important for the results obtained, we will explicitly discuss 
their effects and robustness. As said above, the policy instruments in each regime are 
chosen to maximize welfare. The parameter values used are reported in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 around here 
                                                            
19 In addition, as shown by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Woodford (2003, chapter 6), Schmitt-
Grohé and Uribe (2004) and many others, a second-order approximation to the model’s equilibrium 
solution, as well as to welfare, helps us to avoid potential spurious welfare rankings of various regimes 
that may arise when the model’s equilibrium solution is approximate to first-order only. Actually, Pizer 
(1999) uses a first-order approximation to the equilibrium solution. To solve and simulate the second-
order approximation of the DCE solution under each policy regime, we use the Matlab functions made 
available by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004).   
20 To evaluate the expectation in the welfare calculations, we use numerical integration with 1000 
simulations. We use 300 years in our evaluation of life-time welfare, as, because of discounting, there 
is practically a zero weight attached to later outcomes.   14  
The values of the economic parameters are as in most dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium calibration and estimation studies. Thus, the baseline values used 
for the rate of time preference (β ), the depreciation rate of capital (
k δ ), the capital 
share in output (α ), the intertemporal elasticity of substitution ( σ / 1 ) and the 
constant term ( A) and persistence parameter ( a ρ ) of the TFP process are rather 
standard. As discussed earlier, we will experiment with different values of the 
standard deviation of the TFP process ( a σ ). 
There is, of course, much less empirical evidence and consensus on the value 
of environmental parameters. For reasons discussed below, the most important one is 
µ , namely, the weight given to private consumption vis-à-vis environmental quality 
in the utility function, (1b). For our baseline results, we set µ  at a relatively low level 
(0.6) and discuss other results later on. Regarding the parameters characterizing the 
exogenous process for environmental technology, we choose a high persistence 
parameter ( 933 . 0 = = α φ ρ ρ ) and normalize its constant term, φ , at 0.01. Finally, we 
set  v, namely, how public abatement spending is translated into actual units of 
environmental quality, at 0.5 (this parameter value helps us to match the units in the 
environmental quality equation (3) and hence obtain a well-defined trade-off in 
second-best policy). Since v is fixed across regimes with public abatement spending 
(pollution taxes and pollution permits), its value does not matter for the comparison of 
these two regimes. Nevertheless, it does matter when we compare these two regimes 
to the command-and-control regime which does not allow for public abatement 
spending (we discuss this issue below). 
  We are now ready to present numerical results. Before investigating the 
relatively general case in which exogenous shocks cause fluctuations around steady 
state, we study the deterministic steady state. This will help us to understand the 
working of the model and how results change when uncertainty is introduced. We will 
report results for some key variables as well as for the associated welfare. 
 
Evaluation of regimes at steady state (certainty)  
We first present results when the economy remains at its non-stochastic steady state. 
Results for consumption, c, environmental quality, Q, output,  y , as well as the 
resulting welfare, defined as 
*(, ) uc Q , under each regime are reported in Table 2 (this 
is when the policy instrument is set at its welfare-maximizing value in each case).    
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Table 2 around here 
 
  The second column in Table 2 gives results for the model in section 3, where 
the government sets pollution taxes and uses the collected tax revenues to finance its 
abatement policy. The third column gives results for the model in section 4, where the 
government sets the quantity of pollution permits and finances its abatement policy 
from the sale of those permits. In the fourth column, we give results for the model in 
section 5, where the government sets pollution targets; in contrast to all previous 
regimes, now there are no revenues and hence no abatement policy on the side of the 
government. The sixth, last column reports the social planner solution in section 6; 
this always gives the best outcome as expected (from now on, we do not study this 
first-best case).    
  Taxes and permits (see second and third column in Table 2) are equivalent 
(any second decimal point differences are due to numerical solution approximations 
of the welfare-maximizing value of policy instruments). Both regimes give the same 
social welfare in the long run and, in turn, the same welfare loss over the benchmark 
first-best solution in the last column. However, pure rules (see fourth column) differ 
from the other two second-best regimes. In particular, according to our baseline 
parameter values, Kyoto-like rules appear to be welfare inferior to both taxes and 
permits. In general, however, the welfare comparison is ambiguous depending on 
parameter values. Specifically, our comparative static exercises imply that rules are 
welfare inferior to taxes and permits in the long run, when  0 ν ≥  (which measures 
how public spending on cleanup is translated into actual units of nature) is relatively 
high and/or 0 1 µ <<  (which is the weight given to private consumption vis-à-vis 
environmental quality) is relatively low. Intuitively, when public abatement policy, 
being financed by tax or permit revenues, is effective in preserving the environment 
(i.e. when ν  is high) and/or we value little the distorting effects of taxes and permits 
on private consumption (i.e. when µ  is low), numerical rules are inferior to taxes and 
permits. As ν  gets smaller and/or µ  gets larger, this inferiority diminishes. For very 
low values of ν  and/or very high values of µ , numerical rules turn out to be welfare 
superior to taxes and permits.  
  This finding (namely, that optimally chosen competing instruments are found 
to be nonequivalent in a certainty world) seems, at first sight, to violate Weitzman’s 
(1974) result. However, it arises simply because Kyoto-like rules are not really 
comparable to the other two regimes: in our setting, such rules do not generate public   16  
revenues and hence do not allow for public abatement policy (or, more generally, 
given tax bases, they allow for less public abatement policy than revenue-raising 
regimes like taxes and permits). To make the comparison of different regimes 
meaningful when we introduce uncertainty below, we need to make them equivalent 
in a deterministic world. We therefore add public abatement policy financed by, say, 
pollution taxes into the regime of pure Kyoto-like rules (see Appendix C for details).
21 
Specifically, we choose the steady state tax rate so as to reproduce the same steady 
state solution as in the other two second-best regimes. Results are reported in the fifth, 
second from the end, column in Table 2. In what follows, we will work with this 
mixed regime – Kyoto-like rules combined (in the long run) with public abatement 
financed by pollution taxes – and compare this to taxes and permits. All three regimes 
are now equivalent in a deterministic setup (see also Table 3 below). This respects 
Weitzman’s (1974) logic.  
  Therefore, public abatement activities constitute an important part of 
environmental policy. Policies that yield no revenues, and hence do not allow for 
public abatement, suffer a disadvantage relative to revenue-yielding policies. This of 
course presupposes that any revenues from pollution taxes or permits are earmarked 
for the financing of public abatement. As said above, the crucial role of public finance 
has already been pointed out, although the emphasis has been on the revenue 
recycling effect (see e.g. Bovenberg and Goulder, 2002, section 4.1). In our model, 
without being combined with public abatement policy, pure Kyoto-like rules are not 
really comparable to taxes and permits and, at least for a wide range of parameter 
values used, such rules are inferior to taxes and permits, especially in terms of 
environmental quality (see Table 2).      
 
Evaluation of regimes under uncertainty 
We now allow for uncertainty coming from the exogenous stochastic autoregressive 
processes for production and pollution technologies in equations (6a-b). We suppose 
that the economy is initially at its steady state studied above and, starting from  0 t = , 
there are shocks to  t A  and  t φ .   
  Working as explained above and using the same baseline parameter values, we 
compute discounted expected lifetime utility under each regime for a varying degree 
of uncertainty as summarized by the standard deviations of production and pollution 
                                                            
21 This is allowed at steady state only so as to make all policy regimes equivalent in the deterministic 
fixed point around which the different regimes/solutions fluctuate due to uncertainty. This allows us to   17  
technologies,  a σ  and  φ σ . Results are reported in Table 3. For expositional reasons, 
we study: (i) the deterministic case ( 0 a φ σ σ = = ); (ii) when there is only one source 
of uncertainty ( 01 . 0 = α σ  and  0 = φ σ ; 0 = α σ  and  01 . 0 = φ σ ); (iii) a case of relatively 
low uncertainty in both stochastic variables ( 0.01 αφ σ σ = = ); (iv) two scenarios 
representing high levels of uncertainty in one of the two stochastic variables 
(0 1 . 0 = α σ  and  0.05 φ σ = ; and  0.05 α σ = ,  01 . 0 = φ σ ); (v) a scenario with relatively 
high uncertainty in both stochastic variables ( 0.05 a φ σ σ = = ). 
 
Table 3 around here 
 
  Table 3 confirms that, in a deterministic environment ( 0 a φ σ σ == ), all 
regimes imply the same welfare (see also Table 2 above). In other words, to the extent 
that policy instruments are chosen optimally, and there is no uncertainty, the choice of 
the policy instrument is irrelevant to welfare. Of course, as said, this applies to 
regimes that are comparable (in our case, all of them allow for abatement policy). 
  By contrast, in a stochastic setup where  , 0 a φ σ σ > , the choice of the policy 
instrument does matter. Table 3 reports the welfare gain/loss (i.e. the value of ij ζ ) 
when we choose regime i instead of regime  j i ≠ . A positive value of  ij ζ  means that 
i is superior to  j . For instance, if  0 ij x ζ = > , an agent, who happens to be in  j , will 
require a permanent consumption subsidy of  % x  to become indifferent between  j  
and i. 
  Welfare differences between taxes and permits are summarized by the values 
of  TP ζ  reported in the second column from the end in Table 3. Taxes are always 
superior to permits. For instance, when  0.01 αφ σ σ = = , a welfare gain of 6.41%, in 
terms of private consumption, can be obtained if we use taxes instead of permits. The 
superiority of taxes further increases with the degree of uncertainty. Thus, taxes are 
superior in all cases even when environmental uncertainty is higher than economic 
uncertainty. Also notice that these are substantial welfare gains relatively to those 
found, for instance, in the literature on tax policy regimes (see e.g. Lucas, 1990, who 
compares Ramsey to suboptimal tax structures).    
                                                                                                                                                                      
get a meaningful evaluation of differences across regimes/solutions that are due to uncertainty only.    18  
  We next compare taxes to mixed rules. Welfare differences are summarized by 
the values of  TN ζ  reported in the last column of Table 3. When economic uncertainty 
( a σ ) is higher than, or equal to, environmental uncertainty ( φ σ ), taxes are superior to 
rules. For low levels of uncertainty, such welfare differences are small, but the higher 
a σ  and  φ σ  become, the higher the superiority of taxes over rules, as long as  a φ σ σ ≥ . 
For instance, when  0.05 a σ =  and  0.01 φ σ = , the gain from taxes is 6.08%, while 
when 0.05 a φ σ σ == , the gain is 4.06%. On the other hand, when environmental 
uncertainty is higher than economic uncertainty, rules are better than taxes. For 
instance, when  0.01 a σ =  and  0.05 φ σ = , the gain from rules is 3.85%.    
  Therefore, as shown first by Weitzman (1974), ex ante uncertainty affects the 
choice of the policy instrument. Taxes and mixed rules are substantially better than 
permits; this holds over the whole range of parameter values, the sources of 
uncertainty, and the size of variances of shocks, that we have experimented with. 
Welfare benefits from the use of taxes, instead of permits, can be high for high levels 
of uncertainty irrespectively of where this uncertainty comes from. On the other hand, 
the comparison between taxes and mixed rules depends on the relative variances of 
different categories of shocks. Taxes are better than rules when economic uncertainty 
is no smaller than environmental uncertainty. But, when environmental uncertainty is 
the dominant source of uncertainty, rules outperform taxes. Details and intuition are 
discussed in the next subsection that presents means, variances and covariances of the 
arguments in the welfare criterion.  
  Before we move on, we report that we also get relatively reasonable values for 
the welfare-maximizing policy instrument in each regime. Results are included in 
Table 3. For instance, when  0.01 αφ σ σ = = , the pollution tax rate modeled in (5) is 
found to be 0.197, the quantity of permits in (9) is 0.0136 and the persistence 
parameter under rules in (11) is 0.94. Note that, in general, the values of the policy 
instruments are not increasing in the degree of uncertainty; this is because policy 
intervention is costly and, as explained above, stabilization is only one of the goals of 
policy.  
 
Looking behind welfare under uncertainty 
To understand what is driving the above welfare differences under uncertainty, we 
study the first and second moments of the two arguments in the utility function,   19  
namely, private consumption,  t c , and the stock of environmental quality,  t Q . Note 
from the second-order approximation to the welfare function (14) that, in addition to 
the steady state values of  t c  and  t Q  and their deviations from these steady state 
values, what also matters for welfare is the squared deviations and cross- products of 
t c  and  t Q  from their steady state values. Given that the steady state solution values 
are the same across all policy regimes studied, any welfare differences in the 
stochastic setup are driven by differences in expected means, variances and 
covariances of the series for  t c and  t Q  (see Appendix E for details).  
  Tables 4a-c present the expected means, standard deviations and correlations 
of  t c and  t Q  for all policy regimes under various levels of uncertainty. Welfare 
increases when the means of  t c and  t Q  increase, their variances decrease and their 
correlation decreases. 
 
Table 4 around here 
 
  As can be seen in Table 4, different policy regimes imply different trade-offs 
in outcomes whose net, total effect on welfare was summarized in Table 3 above. 
Some regimes are good for consumption, while others are good for environmental 
quality.  
  In particular, taxes (see Table 4a) and mixed rules (see Table 4c) imply higher 
expected consumption than permits (see Table 4b), while permits are superior in terms 
of expected environmental quality, especially when uncertainty is high. On the other 
hand, variances are higher under permits than under taxes and rules; this applies 
especially to the variance of environmental quality which is substantially higher under 
permits. The higher volatility in environmental quality, in combination with lower 
expected consumption, makes permits the worst regime in all cases studied. On the 
other hand, a weak point of taxes is the high positive correlation between 
consumption and environmental quality (in most cases, correlation is negative both 
under permits and rules, and this is good for welfare).  
  Comparison of the two better regimes, taxes and mixed rules in Tables 4a and 
4c respectively, implies that the main advantages of mixed rules are that they fix 
environmental quality at a higher expected level, practically eliminating all 
environmental variation, and also allow consumption deviations to move counter-
cyclically or a-cyclically with deviations in environmental quality. For this to be   20  
achieved, however, all the adjustment from an exogenously caused stochasticity has to 
be absorbed by consumption. In particular, the expected level of consumption is lower 
(or equal) and its variance is higher under rules than under taxes. When economic 
uncertainty is no smaller than environmental uncertainty, as was summarized in Table 
3, it is the adverse consumption effects (level and variance) that dominate so that 
welfare is higher under taxes.
22 But when environmental uncertainty is the dominant 
source of uncertainty, the benefits from lower variation in environmental quality and 
the inverse correlation between environment and consumption become important 
enough to make rules superior to taxes (this happens, for instance, when  0.01 a σ =  
and 0.05 φ σ =  in Tables 3 and 4).  
  Therefore, in an uncertain world, permits are the worst regime. They can fix 
expected environmental quality at a relatively high level, but only at the cost of 
exposing this expected quality to exogenous shocks and damaging expected private 
consumption. The higher the extrinsic uncertainty, the higher is the disadvantage of 
permits relative to taxes and mixed rules. This holds for a wide range of parameters, 
shocks and relative variances of different categories of shocks. We believe auctioned 
permits are inferior because (as pointed out by Bovenberg and Goulder, 2002, p. 
1520) they are a hybrid of price- and quantity-based regulations. They are price-based 
because market forces determine the price of permits. They are quantity-based 
because the government sets the total amount of permits and hence emissions. The 
problem is that, as a price-based instrument, they are less closely connected to the 
heart of the problem (pollution externality) than pollution taxes. At the same time, as 
a quantity-based instrument, they provide less controllability than numerical emission 
rules that command agents to produce or emit a certain level. This belief is 
strengthened by the result that when the government uses the price of pollution 
permits, instead of their quantity, as a policy instrument (see Appendix B), permits 
and taxes become fully equivalent on and off steady state (results are available upon 
request). 
  The comparison between taxes and mixed rules is open depending on the 
relative variances of different categories of shocks affecting the economy. When 
uncertainty arises from economic factors, taxes are preferable. But when 
environmental uncertainty becomes the dominant source, mixed rules are preferable. 
                                                            
22 This is despite a relatively low value for the weight given to consumption versus environmental 
quality in the utility function in our calibration (see Table 1). Hence, if anything, our calibration does 
not do any favours to the tax regime.   21  
We believe this is consistent with Weitzman’s (1974, pp. 485-6) intuition. As 
Weitzman has shown in a first-best setting, quantities are better than prices, as 
planning instruments, when the benefit function is more curved and/or the cost 
function is more linear. In our model, this seems to be the case under Kyoto-like rules 
in the presence of high uncertainty over the environment. In particular, better 
environmental quality gives a direct welfare benefit to private agents; when 
environmental uncertainty is relatively high, the marginal benefits of an extra unit of 
natural resources change rapidly and thus the curvature of the benefit function is high. 
By contrast, when environmental uncertainty is relatively low, the benefit function is 
closer to being linear. In such a situation, prices are a better instrument; the marginal 
benefit is almost linear in some range so that it is better to name a price and let private 
agents find the optimal quantities themselves. In this case, policies like rules, that 
reduce the number of choices that private agents can make, hurt the macro economy.  
 
8. Conclusions   
 
We evaluated pollution taxes, auctioned pollution permits and Kyoto-like emission 
rules in a unified micro-founded dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. We 
focused on the role of uncertainty and showed the importance of public finance and 
abatement. The latter is an important ingredient of any environmental policy. Permits, 
despite their popularity among politicians, are the worst regime. When we compare 
taxes and rules, taxes are better when economic volatility is the main source of 
uncertainty. On the other hand, when environmental shocks are the dominant source 
of extrinsic uncertainty, numerical rules perform better.   
  We are aware that many issues have not been analyzed. For instance, it would 
be interesting to search for the best international agreement in our setup and, in 
particular, the design of international carbon market and international public funding. 
It is also important to evaluate environmental policies under structural uncertainty 
resulting from model misspecification of the environmental/pollution process. We 
leave these issues for future research.    
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Table 1: Baseline parameter values 
 
Parameter Description  Value 
α   capital share in production  0.33 
k δ   capital depreciation rate  0.1 
σ   curvature parameter in utility function  2 
β   Time discount factor  0.97 
µ   Consumption weight in utility function  0.6 
Q  environmental quality without pollution  1 
q δ   persistence of environmental quality  0.9 
A  long-run total factor productivity  1 
a ρ   persistence of total factor productivity  0.933 
φ   long-run pollution technology  0.01 
φ ρ   Persistence of pollution technology  0.933 
ν   effectiveness of abatement policy  0.5 
 
 
















c  0.85 0.85  1.20 0.85  0.89 
Q  2.26 2.24  0.83 2.26  2.27 
y   1.41 1.41  1.71 1.41  1.56 
*(, ) uc Q   -26.56 -26.60  -32.18 -26.56  -25.75 
Notes: (i) 
* (1 )
(, ) (, )
(1 )
t






, where  300 t =  and  0
300 = β .  We work with discounted welfare 
to make it comparable to the results in Tables 3-4, where simulations are run for 300 years. This is also 
consistent with equation (14). (ii) The fourth regime (numerical rules with abatement) includes tax-
financed abatement policy at steady state so that it is equivalent to the other regimes in a deterministic 






















Notes: (i) The third regime (numerical rules with abatement) includes tax-financed abatement policy at steady state so that it is equivalent to the other regimes in a deterministic 
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t V  denote the discounted sums of second-order approximations to welfare in equation (14) and 
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TN ζ  
(%) 
0  0  0.198  - 26.56  0.0141  - 26.60  -  - 26.56  0.25  0 
0  0.01  0.198  - 26.56  0.0139  - 26.96  0.93  - 26.53  2.49  - 0.19 
0.01  0  0.197  - 26.77  0.0137  - 27.57  0.95  - 26.81  4.90  0.25 
0.01  0.01  0.197  - 26.77  0.0136  - 27.82  0.94  - 26.79  6.41  0.12 
0.01  0.05  0.196  - 26.73  0.0126  - 30.63  0.92  - 26.12  22.70  - 3.85 
0.05  0.01  0.196  - 32.03  0.0117  - 35.79  0.95  - 33.22  18.50  6.08 
0.05  0.05  0.195  - 32.00  0.0115  - 36.34  0.94  - 32.79  21.20  4.06 24 
 
Table 4a: First and second moments for  t c  and  t Q  under taxes 
 
 
a σ   φ σ   ) ( t c E   ) ( t Q E   ) ( t c σ   ) ( t Q σ   ) , ( t t Q c ρ  
0 0.01  0.85  2.26  0.00  0.003  -  0.42 
0.01 0  0.85  2.25  0.03  0.04  0.86 
0.01 0.01  0.85  2.25  0.03  0.04  0.85 
0.01 0.05  0.85  2.25  0.03  0.04  0.80 
0.05 0.01  0.88  2.12  0.14  0.16  0.86 
0.05 0.05  0.88  2.11  0.14  0.16  0.85 
 
 
Table 4b: First and second moments for  t c  and  t Q  under permits 
 
 
a σ   φ σ   ) ( t c E   ) ( t Q E   ) ( t c σ   ) ( t Q σ   ) , ( t t Q c ρ  
0 0.01  0.82  2.38  0.04  0.10  -  0.97 
0.01 0  0.78  2.50  0.03  0.20  -  0.93 
0.01 0.01  0.77  2.55  0.05  0.21  -  0.86 
0.01 0.05  0.65  2.98  0.14  0.31  -  0.86 
0.05 0.01  0.53  3.22  0.11  0.55  -  0.89 
0.05 0.05  0.52  3.28  0.15  0.55  -  0.71 
 
 
Table 4c: First and second moments for  t c  and  t Q  under numerical rules 
 
 
a σ   φ σ   ) ( t c E   ) ( t Q E   ) ( t c σ   ) ( t Q σ   ) , ( t t Q c ρ  
0  0.01  0.85  2.26 0.00 0.00  0.47 
0.01  0  0.85  2.26 0.04 0.00  -0.72 
0.01  0.01  0.85  2.26 0.04 0.00  -0.51 
0.01  0.05  0.85  2.26 0.04 0.01  0.03 
0.05  0.01  0.84  2.26 0.18 0.02  -0.71 
0.05  0.05  0.85  2.26 0.18 0.02  -0.52 
 
   25  
APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A: DCE with pollution taxes 
(i) The first-order conditions of the individual’s problem include the budget constraint 
in (2) and the Euler equation (7b). Then, using (4)-(5) into (3), we get (7c). All this 
gives (7a-c) which is a three-equation system in  11 0 {, , } tt t t ck Q
∞
+ +=  in terms of  0 {} tt τ
∞
= . 
The long-run DCE follows if we simply drop time subscripts.   
 
(ii) A policy of Pigouvian taxes can follow as a special case. Suppose that any 
revenues from pollution taxes are returned to the individual in the form of lump-sum 
transfers,  t S . The budget constraint of the individual is: 
1 (1 ) (1 )
k
tt t t t t t kk c A k S
α δτ + −− +=− +                                                                      (A.1) 
while the budget constraint of the government is:  
tt t t SA k
α τ =                                                                                                                (A.2) 
and therefore the DCE is:  
1 (1 )
k
tt t t t kk c A k
















=− + − ⎢⎥ ∂∂ ⎣⎦
                                                       (A.3b)         
1 (1 )
qq
tt t t t QQ Q A k
α δδ φ + =− + −                                                                              (A.3c)                             
Equations (A.3a)-(A.3c) constitute a new three-equation system in  11 0 {, , } tt t t ck Q
∞
++ =  in 
terms of  0 {} tt τ
∞
= . The long-run DCE follows from (A.3a)-(A.3c) if we simply drop 
time subscripts.   
 
Appendix B: DCE with pollution permits  
(i) The first-order conditions of the individual’s problem include the budget constraint 
in (8) and the Euler equation (10b). Then, using (9) for  t g  and  1 tt t t t p Ak P
α φ − ==  into 
(3), we get (10c), while (10d) has been explained in the text. All this gives (10a-d) 
which is a four-equation system in  11 0 {, , ,} tt t t t ck Q q
∞
+ +=  in terms of  0 {} tt P
∞
= . The long-run 
follows if we simply drop time subscripts. 
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(ii) A policy of “Pigouvian permits” can follow as a special case. Suppose that any 
revenues from the same of pollution permits are returned to the individual in the form 
of lump-sum transfers,  t S . That is, the budget constraint of the agent is: 
11 (1 )
k
tt t t t t t t kk c q p A k S
α δ ++ −− ++ = +                                                                    (B.1) 
while the budget constraint of the government is:  
1 tt t Sq p + = = tt qP                                                                                                                            (B.2) 










+ −− +=                                                                                        (B.3a)                               
11 1
11 1 1 1
1
(1 [ ]) [ (1 )]
k tt
tt t t t t t t
tt
uu
qE A k E A k
cc
αα αφ β δ α
−− +





                                 (B.3b)                               
11 (1 )
qq
tt t QQ Q P δδ +− =− + −                                                                                   (B.3c)                               
11 1 1 [] tt t t t t t PE p E A k
α φ ++ + + ==                                                                                     (B.3d)                               
Equations (B.3a)-(B.3d) constitute a new four-equation system in  11 0 {, , ,} tt t t t ck Q q
∞
++ =  
in terms of  0 {} tt P
∞
= . The long-run DCE follows from (B.3a)-(B.3d) if we simply drop 
time subscripts.   
 
(iii) When the instrument is the price of permits, rather than their quantity, the DCE 
changes from (i) above to:     
11 1 1 (1 )
k
tt t t t t t t t kk c q A k A k
α α δφ ++ + + −− ++ =                                                                (B.4a)  
11 1
11 1 1 1
1
(1 [ ]) [ (1 )]
k tt
tt t t t t t t
tt
uu
qE A k E A k
cc
αα αφ β δ α
−− +





                                 (B.4b)                  
11 1 1 (1 )
qq
tt t t t t t t t QQ Q A k q A k
α α δδ φ ν φ ++ + + =− + − +                                                      (B.4c) 
Equations (B.4a)-(B.4c) constitute a three-equation system in  11 0 {, , } tt t t ck Q
∞
+ +=  in terms 
of  0 {} tt q
∞
= . The long-run DCE follows from (B.4a)-(B.4c) if we simply drop time 
subscripts.  
 
Appendix C: DCE with pollution rules  
(i) Using (4) into (11), we get (12b) which gives the motion of private capital. All this 
gives (12-c) as DCE which constitute a three-equation system in  11 0 {, , } tt t t ck Q
∞
++ =  in 
terms of the long-run target pollution,  p , and the path of  0 {} tt γ
∞
= . In the long run, 



















                                                                                                     (C.1b) 
which can be solved for c and Q in terms of  p  (recall that, in the long-run,  p  is a 
policy choice and that, in all periods,  tt t t p Ak
α φ = ). 
 
(ii) We now add public abatement financed by lump-sum taxes,  t S . That is, the 
budget constraint of the individual is:  
1 (1 )
k
tt t t t t kk c A k S
α δ + −− += −                                                                                (C.2)                  
while the budget constraint of the government is:  
tt GS =                                                                                                                       (C.3) 
and therefore the DCE is:  
1 (1 )
k
tt t t t t kk c G A k
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k                                                                              (C.4b) 
1 (1 )
qq
tt t t t t QQ Q A k G
α δ δφ ν + =− + − +                                                                     (C.4c) 





















                                                                                                     (C.5b) 
which can be solved for c and Q in terms of  p  and G . 
 
(iii) We now add public abatement financed by output/pollution taxes,  t τ . That is, the 
budget constraint of the individual is:  
1 (1 ) (1 )
k
tt t t t t kk c A k
α δτ + −− +=−                                                                              (C.6)                   
while the budget constraint of the government is:  
tt t t GA k
α τ =                                                                                                                (C.7) 
and therefore the DCE is:  
1 (1 ) (1 )
k
tt t t t t kk c A k
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k                                                                              (C.8b)                         
1 (1 ) ( )
qq
tt t t t t QQ QA k
α δδφ ν τ + =− + − −                                                                   (C.8c)                     

























                                                                                                (C.9b) 
which can be solved for c and Q in terms of  p  and τ . 
 
Appendix D: Social planner solution  
The planner chooses  11 0 {, , , } tt t tt cgk Q
∞




tt t t t t kk c g A k
α δ + −− ++ =                                                                               (D.1a)                               
1 (1 )
qq
tt t t t t QQ Q A k g
α δ δφ ν + =− + − +                                                                     (D.1b) 
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where 0 > ξ   is  a  dynamic  multiplier  associated  with  (D.1b),                           
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(D.1b) and (D.2a)-(D.2c) constitute a five-equation system in { }
∞
= + + 0 1 1 , , , , t t t t t t g Q k c ξ . 
The long-run DCE follows if we simply drop time subscripts.   
  
Appendix E: Statistical moments  
To see that examining the means, variances and covariances of the variables in levels 
is equivalent to examining the same moments for the variables defined as deviations 
from their (common) steady state, note the following. For the random variables x and   29  
y , define  x x x − = ˆ  and  y y y − = ˆ , where x  (resp.  y ) is the average value of x 
(resp.  y ). Then, the relationship between the mean of x and the mean of  x ˆ is given 
by:  
x x E x E − = ) ( ) ˆ (                                                                                                        (E.1) 
(E.1) implies that, when x  is the same across regimes, any differences in the mean of 
x are due to differences in the mean of x ˆ . The relationship between 
2 ˆ x  and the 
variance of x ˆ  is given by:  
2 2 2 )] ˆ ( [ ) ˆ ( )] ˆ ( ˆ [ ) ˆ var( x E x E x E x E x − = − =                                                                  (E.2)  
Hence, given the mean of x ˆ , any differences in the average value of 
2 ˆ x  are captured 
by differences in the variance of x ˆ . Further, the variances of  x and  x ˆ  are the same, 
i.e.  ) var( )] ) ( ( ) [( )] ˆ ( ˆ [ ) ˆ var(
2 2 x x x E x x E x E x E x = − − − = − = . Finally, given their 
means, any differences in the cross-products of  x ˆ  and  y ˆ  are captured by their 
covariance, i.e.  ) ˆ ( ) ˆ ( ] ˆ ˆ [ ) ˆ , ˆ cov( y E x E y x E y x − = , where: 
{} { } ) , cov( )] ) ( ( ) )][( ) ( ( ) [( )] ˆ ( ˆ )][ ˆ ( ˆ [ ) ˆ , ˆ cov( y x y y E y y x x E x x E y E y x E x E y x = − − − − − − = − − =  (E.3)   30  
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